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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the 
International Hellenic University.  
This thesis examines the impact of capital structure on the performance of the banking 
sector in Greece. The analysis is based on the annual financial statements from 2007-
2018 of the four systemic Greek banks listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) such 
as: Alpha Bank S.A., Eurobank Ergasias S.A., National Bank of Greece S.A., Piraeus 
Bank S.A. Regression analysis has been carried out through the use of Econometric 
Views (EViews) 9, having Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and 
Earnings per Share (EPS) as performance indicators along with Debt-to-Equity (D/E) 
and Debt-to-Assets (D/A) ratios as proxies for capital structure, considering profitability 
as a dependent variable and capital structure as an independent one. Moreover, two 
control variables, namely the banks’ Size and the banks’ annual Growth rate were also 
included in the model. The study reveals that capital structure has a significant impact on 
the banks’ performance and presents mixed results since it concluded that the capital 
structure has both negative and positive impacts on the banks’ performance. Capital 
structure was found to have both negative and positive significant relationship with 
Return on Equity, while Debt to Assets has a significant positive relationship with Return 
on Assets and Debt to Equity has an insignificant negative relationship with Return on 
Assets. Accordingly, Return on Assets was found to have insignificant positive 
relationship with capital structure. 
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Introduction 
The theory of capital structure and its connection with the firms’ performance attracted 
the interest of many researchers in corporate finance literature since the Modigliani and 
Miller’s theorem (1958). In the purpose of mitigating any kind of risk such as operational, 
credit, market, the Basel Committee issued guidelines regarding the minimum capital 
requirements of the banks. The banking sector in most economies of the world is of vast 
importance since it is connected to economic growth. Abor (2005) presented that bank’s 
profitability is highly influenced by capital structure. The pursuance of the optimum 
mixture of debt and equity appears to be a constant in the strategic planning of the firms 
as well as for financial institutions in such a way that would assist them to curtail their 
risk exposures by taking absolute advantage of their overall market value. It is also 
important for the Greek banks to have the ability to finance their operations on the basis 
that their profitability is maintained on high levels. Moreover, during the years and due to 
the technological progress, the competition in the banking sector has been increased 
and resulted to significant changes in the financial and monetary banking environment 
(Spathis et al., 2002). 
Capital structure plays a crucial role as a reference theory in the financing policy of a 
firm. A mix of debt and equity financing is the main component of the capital structure. 
One of the most complex matters of corporate finance is associated with whether this 
capital structure is optimal or not. Therefore, the decision of the optimum mixture of debt 
and equity should be strategically designed in order to achieve the maximization of the 
firm’s returns or the shareholders’ wealth and reach the desired levels of profitability. The 
current price of the firm’s shares represents the shareholders’ levels of wealth. In 
pursuance to this goal, the firm’s management should take rational financing decisions 
that would minimize the firm’s cost of capital (Goyal, 2013). 
The modern theory of capital structure is based on the pioneer work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958). As Modigliani and Miller preliminary stated in their capital structure 
irrelevance theory which was published in 1958, under perfect capital market conditions, 
the mixture of debt and equity through which a firm finances its assets, has no 
significance in the value of the firm. However, this preposition was based on the 
assumption of perfect capital markets and consequently, not long after, Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) released an emendation of their prior paper, stating that debt’s tax 
deductibility would avert the ‘’arbitrage process from making the value of all firms in a 
given class proportional to the expected returns generated by their physical assets’’. 
Variant theories such as the pecking order theory, the static trade-off theory and the 
agency cost theory have risen in the later years, trying to enlighten the firm’s capital 
structure decision. 
As a result of the comparison between debt with equity, it is evident that debt is cheaper 
than equity (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), however it entails some constrains by the 
means that it can impact the firm’s leverage up to a certain degree (Brealey et al., 2012). 
Debt to Equity ratio as a proxy for the capital structure condition of a firm shows the 
proportion of the firm’s debt and equity and can be calculated by the division of the total 
liabilities of a firm by its stockholders’ equity. Moreover, a high Debt to Equity ratio 
indicates that a firm is quite leveraged and that it relies more on its debt rather than its 
equity. As regards to the banking sector, in order to assess its performance, profitability 
is the ultimate measure. Profitability is related with the capability of a firm to efficiently 
use its resources within its business activities in order to create profit, and thence it can 
be used as a proxy to measure efficiency. The combination of the following ratios: 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings per Share (EPS) can 
present a quite precise indicator as far as profitability is concerned. 
Numerous of studies have examined the effect of the connection between firm’s 
performance and capital structure under different circumstances; however the results 
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showed that there is no consensus. Thence, there is a necessity for further research with 
the objective to shed light into the interrelation between profitability and capital structure. 
1 Literature Review 
 
1.1 Theoretical Literature Review 
1.1.1 Capital Structure and Theoretical Framework 
Capital structure refers to the way firms or financial institutions finance their overall 
operations by using a mix of sources such as debt, preferred stock and issued equity. In 
general, capital structure illustrates the proportion of debt and equity as regards the total 
capital of a firm, that will be invested within a long duration, in other words its long-term 
financial mix. The capital structure decision of a firm or a financial institution refers to the 
decision of the proportionate relationship of the long-term financial mix. In the best 
possible scenario, as regards banks, a financial manager should be able to determine 
the optimum mixture of debt and equity in order to minimize its cost of capital and 
maximize its market value.  
1.1.2 The Modigliani and Miller’s Irrelevance Theory 
The theoretical framework of capital structure was shaped by Modigliani and Miller(1958) 
whose pioneer work set the ground for a numerous set of theories that were developed 
in the following years. Modigliani and Miller(1958) argued that the assurance of a firm’s 
value is not related to the capital structure;under the condition of miscellaneous 
assumptions of perfect capital market such as lack of taxes, perfect capital markets, 
homogenous expectations and no transaction costs. Their famous ‘’Irrelevance 
Theorem’’ stated indeed that the value of any firm is not related to its financing 
decisions. Under Modigliani and Miller’s first proposition of perfect capital markets, there 
is no optimal capital structure mix and therefore a capital structure mix that is superior to 
other does not exist.  
In M&M’s ‘’perfect capital markets’’ all kinds of investors and traders have the same 
access to information and there are no brokerage fees, transferred taxes and transaction 
fees incurred(1961). ‘’Rational behaviour’’ for M&M referred to investors that are wealth 
maximizers and indifferent of the form in which their wealth is transformed into; cash 
payments or an increase in the market value of their shares. Moreover, ‘’perfect 
certainty’’, signifies the complete assertion for all the investors as regards ‘’ the future 
investment program and the future profits of every corporation’’(Miller and Modigliani, 
1961, pp.412). Having said that, their second ‘’Irrelevance Theorem’’ proposition stated 
that ‘’given a firm’s investment policy, the divident payout policy it chooses to follow will 
affect neither the current price of its shares nor the total return to its shareholders’’ (Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961, pp.414). That is, in perfect capital markets, neither capital 
structure decisions nor divident payout policies are significant. 
Not long after, the assumptions of M&M’s propositions were found to be unrealistic, a 
fact that led Modigliani and Miller to proceed with the issuance of a correction of their 
previous theorem, admitting the effect of income taxation on the market value of firms, in 
1963. The ‘’expansion’’ of their theorem presented the view that the tax deductability of 
debt would prevent the ‘’arbitrage process from making the value of all firms in a given 
class proportional to the expected returns generated by their physical assets’’ (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1963, pp.433-434). According to them, the increase of debt decreases the 
average cost of capital upon the effect of the interest tax shield, whereas at the same 
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time the market value and the return on equity increase, hence firms should increase 
their debt proportion as regards their capital structure (Jaros and Bartosova, 2015). 
However, Modigliani and Miller underlined the fact that this tax advantage for debt 
financing doesn’t make it unquestionable for firms to pursue the maximum available 
amount of debt in their capital structures, because sometimes other forms of financing 
might be proved to be cheaper (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
In practice, the correction of the M&M theorem was difficult to accept, since it did not 
include a crucial variable, the cost of financial difficulties. As regards Miller and the 
optimization of the capital structure, he intended to incorporate both the corporate and 
the individual taxes into this theory, which indeed was published in 1977. He concluded 
that the purpose of each firm is to achieve the minimization of the present value of all the 
taxes that it pays, and not the minimization of the firm’s individual tax shield. Moreover, 
he was the first to introduce the conceptual framework of personal taxes and specified 
that taxes also included the ones that are paid by firm’s shareholders of stocks and 
bonds (Miller, 1977).  
It is true that the Modigliani and Miller theorem at some level provided an unrealistic 
approach of how firms finance their overall operations. Nevertheless, their work was a 
stepping stone for the development of numerous future theories of capital structure and 
changed the world of corporate finance theory. Among these theories, there are four 
major ones that deviate from Modigliani and Miller’s assumption of perfect capital 
markets: Trade off theory, Pecking order theory, Agency cost theory and Market timing 
theory. 
1.1.3 Trade-off Theory 
Trade-off theory was originally emerged through a debate over the Modigliani and Miller 
theorem. It is considered a development of M&M’s theory however it also includes the 
impact of bankruptcy costs and taxes. By including these market imperfections, a firm is 
‘’setting a target debt-to-value ratio and gradually moving towards it, in much the same 
way that a firm adjusts dividends to move towards a target payout ratio’’ (Myers, 1984, 
pp.576). In other words, trade-off theory suggests that firms balance the costs and 
benefits of equity versus debt in pursuance of obtaining a target debt ratio. 
Under the static trade-off theory, firms should supersede equity with debt and vice versa, 
up to the point that the firm’s value is maximized (Myers, 1984). This means that if there 
are no costs of adjustment, the optimal ratio for each firm should be its perceived debt-
to-value ratio. 
Part of the Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theorem was the presumption that there were 
no taxes. As an evolution of this theorem, trade-off theory, walks the same path but also 
implicates the effect derived from the presence of taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs. 
Accordingly, the optimal capital structure is described as the balance between 
bankruptcy costs and tax benefit arising from debt. Bankruptcy costs are described as 
costs that are straightly provoked when a firm’s probability of default is higher than zero. 
As the level of debt increases, the probability of bankruptcy follows the same direction in 
the dread that the firm might find it difficult to produce the necessary profits in order to 
cover its interest payments. Furthermore, costs of bankruptcy might be direct and 
indirect. Liquidation cost, a component of bankruptcy costs, reflects the loss of the firm’s 
value and includes the distribution of the firm’s assets to claimants. However, the main 
cost that a firm realizes is the cost which has been occurred upon the firm and its 
stakeholders (Warner, 1977). Another cost which is derived from the conflicts of interest 
among the numerous stakeholder groups of the firm, is referred to as agency costs as 
described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In their study, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
focused on the conflict of interest between the principals and the agents of the firms.  
A disadvantage of the condition when a firm relies more on debt is the cost of probable 
financial distress. Therefore, by including the agency costs variable into the trade-off 
theory, the decision regarding the firm’s capital structure choice happens by trading off 
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the tax shield benefits of debt and the costs of financial distress when it relies more on 
debt, and by trading off agency costs of equity with agency costs of debt. Consequently, 
it is evident that the tax shield benefits and the costs of financial distress are equalized.  
Main variables of the trade-off theory are the significance of tax-shield derived from debt 
and the information asymmetry that exists in the financial capital markets. Particularly, 
because of the fact that the interest on debt has the benefit of being a tax deductible 
expense, firms are being able to save tax by using more debt. However, personal taxes 
can perplex this process (Miller, 1977). Moreover, regarding the information asymmetry 
variable, it means that each party in the financial market has different information with 
regards to the market conditions. In such case, the participant who is more informed in a 
transaction is the one who benefits the most.  
There are also other theories regarding the optimal capital structure, such as the one 
suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), which was an extend of Miller’s analysis 
that fused into the capital structure model the non-debt tax shields such as depreciation. 
Opposed to Miller’s (1977) debt irrelevance preposition, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
presented an optimum, non-zero, degree of debt (Swanson et al., 2003). More 
specifically, they presented the optimal ratio of debt for a firm on a theoretical basis, 
whereas ‘’in market equilibrium, each firm will have a unique interior optimum leverage 
decision which equates the present value of the expected marginal net tax advantage of 
debt to the present value of expected marginal default costs’’ (DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980, pp.20). Moreover, one of the most important findings of their study was the 
positive relationship between leverage and effective tax rate.  
1.1.4 Pecking order Theory 
Another important theory for capital structure is the pecking order theory which suggests 
that firms should finance their operations by using firstly their internally generated 
sources such as retained earnings rather than resorting to external sources of 
financing(debt and equity). Accordingly, firms’ managers design the financing strategy by 
giving priority to the retained earnings of the firm where there is no presence of 
information assymetry, then in the need of supplementary funding they will proceed with 
the issuance of debt, and only as a last resort they choose to issue equity in order to 
deal with any further capital requirements. As far as information asymmetry theories are 
concerned, Myers and Majluf (1984) in their study suggested a similar point of view, that 
indeed there is a hierarchy in the way firms choose to finance their overall operations. As 
far as investors are concerned, they cannot make precise estimations regarding the 
value of the shares that are issued for financing reasons, because of the information 
asymmetry. Consequently, on the one hand the announcement of stock issuance could 
signal positively on the investors by means of future potential growth, while on the other 
hand it could have a negative signal in the case that managers are attempting to issue 
overvalued shares. However, Myers and Majluf (1984) advised that managers who are 
market-value maximizers, in case they appear to be more informed than outside 
investors that are rational, will deflect external equity financing. 
Pecking order theory presents the view that firms prefer to sell equity when there are 
such market conditions, which render equity overvalued (Myers, 1984). The assumption 
that managers act in favor of the firm’s shareholders, attributes to the establishment of 
this view. Consequently, managers will proceed with the issuance of depreciated shares 
only on condition that the transmission of value from the already existing shareholders to 
new investors is enough in order to outweigh the growth opportunity of the net present 
value. (Constantinides, et al., 2003) 
It is true that debt as compared to equity has a preceding claimant on the firm’s earnings 
and assets, while equity constitutes the residual claimant. Having said that, investors in 
debt, are presented to have a limited susceptibility to errors connected with the valuation 
of the firm. Managers, on faith that the shares of their firm are underrated, will seize the 
opportunity to issue debt rather than equity. The issuance of equity in the case that the 
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option of debt is available as well, will have an adverse impact on the managers’ 
objectives. Solely when debt appears to be high-priced and the threat of financial 
distress is evident, managers will proceed with the issuance of equity. 
Under the pecking order theory, when external funds are necessary for financing 
reasons, firms will always prefer to firstly issue the safest security, that is debt, before 
equity. In the event that further funding is required, firms choose from the safer to the 
riskier debt, as the theory suggests, and will lastly employ equity under the threat of 
financial distress. Thence, the aggregated demand for external financing is depicted by 
the total debt ratio of the firm. This theory, illustrates that the motive of a profitable firm, 
is to borrow on a low volume. This is explained by the fact that profitable firms happen to 
have more internal sources of financing accessible, therefore their need for external 
sources is limited as compared to less profitable ones.  
Both pecking order and trade-off theory suggest that managers take action in favor of 
the shareholders. However, their main difference is centered to the fact that pecking 
order theory regards as shareholders only the existing ones while trade-off theory also 
includes the probable ones. Moreover, empirical evidence bolsters the arguments of 
both these theories. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fama and French (2002), in their 
studies, presented evidence that constituted both pecking order and trade-off theories to 
be acceptable. They demonstrated that there is a negative connection amidst current 
debt levels and measures of past profitability (Chen et al., 2013). More specifically, 
Fama and French (2002) supported that firms with more investments as compared to 
their earnings, have lower target dividend payouts since they have lower free cash flows, 
as also suggested by the trade-off theory. Further on, they showed that the marginal 
relationship between book leverage and investments is positive, which is also presented 
in the pecking order theory. Particularly, that is that firms with high profitability inclined to 
their investments do indeed have less leverage. 
1.1.5 Agency Cost Theory 
Agency costs occur from the extended use of debt in the capital structure of firms. 
Corporate governance theory presumes that agency costs are influenced by leverage 
and therefore they affect the firm’s performance. Both in financial and non-financial 
institutions, corporate governance underlines the importance of agency costs. In a well 
functioned firm, the segregation of ownership and control has a ripple effect: managers 
choosing to act solely on their benefit, employing less work effort and thence failing to 
expand the firm’s value. (Berger and Di Patti, 2006)  
Theory, presents the view that the choice of capital structure could aid to allay these 
agency costs. As per the agency cost hypothesis, high leverage and low equity/asset 
ratio encourage managers to act on the shareholders’ interests and therefore mitigate 
the agency costs and expand the firm’s value. In other words, agency cost theory 
suggests that an optimum capital structure can be achieved through the minimization of 
the costs arising from the conflicts of interest among the managers and the shareholders 
of the firm and those between debt-holders and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) pointed out in their paper, that leverage could be utilized as a tool to guide the 
managers to go after the firm’s objectives and goals instead of pursuing their own. High 
financial leverage through the probability of liquidation could have a direct impact on the 
salaries and the stature of the managers (Williams, 1987). Thence, high levels of 
leverage are expected to lower agency costs, diminish managerial incompetence and 
improve managerial and firm performance (Aghion et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) underlined the fact that debt creation engages firms to pay 
out cash, so that the level of ‘’free’’ cash that would have been potentially available for 
managers to be exploited, is eventually decreased. The advantage of debt financing is 
exactly the alleviation of the conflict between managers and shareholders (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991). Myers (1977) presented the view that equity holders might be lacking 
interest to invest new capital even in value increasing schemes, when there is a 
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probability for the firm to go bankrupt. The reason is that the outcome of the investment 
is principally realized by the debt holders, whereas equity holders carry only its total cost. 
The higher the debt levels, the more likely the dismissal of projects that are value 
maximizing is. 
Agency costs and capital structure decisions are quite important matters for the banking 
industry. Due to the fact that banks have the tendency to hold private information of their 
credit counterparties, agency costs are thought to be substantial. Moreover, banking 
regulation is structured in such a way to have a direct impact on the capital structure of 
the banks, by establishing a minimum of requirements for equity capital and other 
classes of capital in pursuance of the depreciation of redundant risk. Moreover, on the 
grounds that the banking industry plays a vital role in the stabilization of the economies, 
being a credit supplier to non-financial institutions and channeling the monetary policy, 
corporate governance, capital structure and agency costs are issues of vast importance 
(Berger and Di Patti, 2006). 
1.1.6 Market Timing Theory 
Market timing theory is the most recent of the capital structure theories which was 
presented by Baker and Wurgler in 2002. The market timing theory of capital structure 
indicates that the current capital structure is the aggregated result of previous attempts 
to record the equity market. It suggests that firms prefer to resort to external equity when 
its cost is low, and alternatively they choose debt. More specifically, the firm’s decisions 
regarding its financing signal the outcome of the past adjustments to its stock price, and 
additionally its objective to time the market. When the financial market has such 
disadvantageous circumstances that lead to strict control on behalf of the shareholders, 
firms’ managers face a limitation against the market’s restrictions and recourse to the 
issuance of less risky debt (Ahmadimousaabad, et al, 2013).  
The empirical work conducted by Baker and Wurgler (2002), showed that there is a 
negative relationship amidst current market leverage and extrinsic finance-weighted 
average of historical market-to-book ratios, as a result of market timing. This challenged 
both the trade-off and pecking order theories by the assumption that the observed 
capital structure is the result of precedent attempts to time equity issues. Pecking order 
theory assumed that financial markets have quasi-strong efficiency, thence an 
announcement of securities issuance would result to extended information asymmetry. 
Market timing theory does not rely on the expectation that financial markets have a 
quasi-strong form of efficiency and that this efficiency is maintained. This can only 
happen on condition that the cost of equity shows an inconsistency over time, despite 
the reasons the led to this situation, so that market conditions let managers exploit the 
opportunities that have risen.  
As Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggested, equity market timing is the process of high-
priced share issuance and their impending repurchase at a lower price. The purpose is 
to utilize this momentary inconsistency of the cost of equity as compared to other 
structures of capital. Conforming to neutral market conditions, firms finance their 
operations as per the pecking order theory that is to opt for external sources to internal 
ones and choose equity as the last means of financing. Nevertheless, when firms seek 
external financing and there are such market conditions that debt is more costly than 
external equity, firms prefer the latter. In contrast, trade-off theory suggested that market 
anomalies create a connection between leverage and firm value and firms take actions 
in order to counterbalance the divergence from their optimal debt ratios. Moreover, it 
denotes that in case of no adjustment costs, firms should never avert from their optimal 
leverage. 
Various studies based on the market timing theory, Hovakimian et al. (2001), Welch 
(2004), Kayhan and Titman (2007) also supported that the history of the firm’s market 
value has an effect on the issuance of equity. More indicatively, Welch (2004, pp.107) 
stated that ‘’[..] over reasonably long time frames, the stock price effects are 
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considerably more important in explaining debt-equity ratios than previously identified 
proxies. Stock returns are the primary known component of capital structure and capital 
structure changes.’’. Hovakimian et al. (2001) found evidence that were consistent with 
the view that managers that possess exclusive information time the issuance of equity as 
well as their repurchase decisions and that firms with low market-to-book ratio are prone 
to the issuance of debt rather than equity. Despite the evidence that market timing 
exists, Kayhan and Titman (2007) presented information that market timing did not 
include its long term effect on the firm and the fact that firms move towards a target debt 
ratio. 
1.2  Empirical Literature Review 
The empirical literature shows that there are numerous of studies that aim to provide 
evidence regarding the connection between capital structure, banks’ and firms’ 
performance. On the one hand, researchers conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between capital structure and bank performance, whereas others argue with this opinion 
and suggest that there is a negative relationship on the performance of the banks.  
1.2.1 Banking Sector 
Berger and Di Patti (2006) studied the impact of the agency costs hypothesis on banks’ 
performance by using data on the U.S. banking industry and more specifically their focus 
was pointed towards the commercial banks. Their study showed a consistency with the 
agency costs hypothesis that is that all others being equal, lower equity capital ratio or 
higher leverage is connected to higher profit efficiency. 
Amidu (2007), in order to examine the forces involved in the determination of the listed 
banks in Ghana used numerous variables and concluded that there is a negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability. More specifically, his study showed that 
asset structure, bank size, corporate tax, growth and profitability have indeed an impact 
on the banks’ capital structure or financing decisions. Furthermore, banks’ leverage was 
found to be negatively related to operating assets and short-term debt and leverage 
resulted to be moving in the same direction.  
Awunyo-Vitor and Badu (2012), also empirically investigated the relationship between 
leverage or capital structure and the performance of the listed banks in Ghana from 
2000 to 2010. Their results showed that there were high levels of gearing between the 
sampled banks from Ghana Stock Exchange. Their regression results underlined the fact 
that there was an inverse relationship between capital structure and Return on Equity 
and Tobin’s Q.  
Goyal (2013), investigated the impact of capital structure on the profitability of the public 
sector Indian banks that were listed on national stock exchange during the years 2008 to 
2012. Goyal (2013), in order to demonstrate this relationship used regression analysis as 
methodology and the Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) and Earnings 
per Share (EPS) ratios as measures of profitability. He showed that there is a positive 
relationship between the short-term debt ratio of the public-sector banks in India and 
their profitability.  
The impact of capital structure on the performance of banks was also examined by Taani 
(2013), who collected data from the Jordanian banks that were listed in the Amman 
Stock Exchange. For the purpose of estimating those two variables, Taani (2013) used 
Net Profit, Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), and Net Interest Margin as performance 
indicators and Total Debt was used for the capital structure variable. Evidence showed 
that there is a positive relationship between the performance indicators and total debt 
ratio.  
Hasan et al. (2014) studied the impact of capital structure on the performance of 36 firms 
listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange in Bangladesh. They used as measures of performance 
and dependent variables: Earnings per Share (EPS), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on 
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Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q, whereas as independent variables they used three capital 
structure ratios: short-term debt, long-term debt and total debt. By using panel data 
regression method, the paper concluded that EPS is significantly positive related with 
short-term debt and significantly negatively related with long-term debt. Moreover, the 
study suggested that there was a significant negative connection among capital structure 
and ROA and furtherly that there was no statistically significant relationship between 
capital structure and firm performance as measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q.  
Tarek Al-Kayed et al. (2014), by the use of a sample including 85 Islamic banks’ banking 
systems in 19 countries, examined the effect of capital structure on the Islamic Banks’ 
performance. Their results indicated that capital structure positively affects profitability as 
assessed by Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) and Profit Margin 
(BTP/TA). Moreover, they concluded that an increase in financing in length of consumer 
and short-term financing has a direct positive impact on the banks’ profitability. 
Hawaldar et al. (2016), analyzed the financial performance of retail and wholesale 
Islamic banks that were operating in Bahrain. Their study found evidence that there is a 
significant positive correlation among operational efficiency ratio, staff cost to income 
ratio and cost to income ratio of wholesale banks. Their empirical results for the retail 
banks, showed that there is a negative relationship amidst asset utilization ratio and staff 
cost to income ratio, operational efficiency ratio and cost to income ratio. 
Musah (2017) examined the effect of capital structure and banks’ profitability as 
measured by ROA, ROE and long-term, short-term and total debt ratios. The study used 
as a sample 23 commercial banks in Ghana and showed that long-term and short-term 
debt ratios are negatively related to profitability whereas the total debt ratio was found to 
be positively related to profitability. 
Siddik et al (2017), in their study tried to fill the gap between capital structure and banks’ 
performance. By using a sample of 22 banks for the period of 2005 to 2014 and as 
measures of profitability Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings 
per Share (EPS), their study empirically investigated the impact of capital structure on 
the performance of the banks in Bangladesh. Their results showed that all capital 
structure variables, Total Debt to Assets (TDTA), Short-Term Debt to Assets (STDA) and 
Long-Term Debt to Assets (LTDA), have a significant inverse impact on ROA, while 
TDTA and STDTA were found to have a significant negative impact on ROE. Moreover, 
as regards EPS, LTDTA and STDTA they also appeared to have a significant negative 
relationship. 
1.2.2 Other sectors 
Gleason et al. (2000), who used data that concerned the European countries for the 
retail sector and measured the firm’s performance with the return on assets (ROA) ratio, 
found out that capital structure has a significant negative effect on the firm’s 
performance. 
Hadlock and James (2002), in their study by using a sample of 500 firms, found a rather 
positive relationship between capital structure and firms’ performance and underlined the 
fact that firms observed with high profitability tend to have also high levels of debt. On 
the same route, Deesomsak et al. (2004) also found results regarding the Asia Pacific 
region, which suggested that the capital structure of the firm has a negative relationship 
with the firm’s performance. Deesomsak et al. (2004) used as a measure of performance 
the gross profit margin ratio.  
Abor (2005) also investigated this relationship in the listed firms in Ghana. The results 
suggested a significantly positive relation between Return on Equity (ROE) and short-
term debt to total assets ratios. Regardless of this, there were also findings that were 
negatively connecting Return on Equity (ROE) and long-term debt to total assets ratios 
as well. However, taking into account the total amounts of debt and return, evidence 
showed positive correlation between the Return on Equity (ROE) ratio and the ratio of 
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total debt to total assets. Furthermore, he included that as far as highly profitable firms 
were concerned; debt appeared to be a major source of financing. 
Huang (2006) in his paper that concerned Chinese listed companies used the Return on 
Assets (ROA) ratio as a measure of performance and the ratios of long-term debt and 
total debt as measures for the capital structure. Huang(2006) found negative correlation 
among capital structure and firm performance.  
Margaritis and Psillaki (2007), in their relevant study, used as a sample French 
manufacturing firms and examined the connection between ownership, capital structure 
and firm performance among different industries. Their results, also found evidence of 
positive relationship between profitability and capital structure.  
Weill (2008), studied the relationship among financial leverage and firm’s performance 
by using data from seven European countries. The findings in Belgium, France, 
Germany and Norway showed a significant negative connection. The ones in Italy and 
Spain showed a significant positive relationship between financial leverage and firms’ 
performance.  
Ebaid (2009) showed that the connection of the performance on the emerging economy 
of Egypt and the capital structure is quite frail. As measures for the firm’s performance, 
he used short-term, long-term and total debt to total assets ratios and showed that they 
are insignificantly connected with the performance of the sampled non-financial firms 
which was measured by Return on Equity (ROE). Moreover, the results showed that 
long-term debt was negatively and insignificantly correlated with Return on Assets (ROA) 
whereas total debt and short term debt to assets ratios were significantly and negatively 
connected to the firms’ performance. 
San and Heng (2011) in their paper also investigated the same relationship, but more 
specifically they used data on construction companies in Malaysia before and after the 
global economic crisis of 2007. Their results showed that there is indeed a relationship 
between firm performance and capital structure. 
Gill et al. (2011) by using a sample of 272 American firms listed on New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), investigated the relationship among capital structure and profitability. 
Their results showed a positive relationship between short-term, long-term and total debt 
as regards profitability measured by ROE. 
Chinaemerem and Anthony (2012) in their paper used a sample of 30 non-financial firms 
that were listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and studied the connection of their 
financial performance with capital structure. The data concerned the years from 2004 to 
2010 and were analyzed using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Their 
conclusion was that the firms’ capital structure has a significantly negative impact on 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).  
Shubita and Alsawalhah (2012) examined the effect of capital structure on profitability by 
using data of industrial companies listed in Amman Stock Exchange during 2004-2009. 
By the use of multiple regression analysis, they concluded that there is a significant 
negative relationship between debt and profitability and suggested that profitable firms 
tend to choose equity as their main financing option. 
Vatavu (2015), aimed to establish the relationship between the capital structure and the 
financial performance of Romanian manufacturing companies, listed on the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange, over a period of eight years. The results showed that as main 
determinants of firm performance were the capital structure, the firm size, exchange 
rates and business risk. Moreover, Vatavu (2015) showed that the shareholders’ equity 
has a positive connection with the performance indicators, whereas Return on 
Equity(ROE) and Return on Assets(ROA) were negatively affected by short-term and 
total debt. 
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2 Research Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of capital structure on the financial 
performance of the banking industry in Greece and establish the relationship between 
those two. More specifically, the study uses secondary data for the reason that its aim is 
to enlighten the impact of capital structure on the public systemic banks that are listed on 
the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).  
2.2 Data and Sample 
The population of the study is the banking sector in Greece. The sample of the study is 
composed by observations of the four (4) systemic banks of Greece with range from 
year 2007 to 2018: Alpha Bank S.A., Eurobank Ergasias S.A., National Bank of Greece 
S.A., Piraeus Bank S.A. As main sources of data collection for the study, secondary 
consolidated data were used, retrieved from the annual reports of the sampled banks 
and from the ThomsonONE database in the purpose of fulfilling the study’s objectives. 
Moreover, for the purpose of data analysis, EViews 9 software was used. A presentation 
of the study’s main variables in presented in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Presentation of the study’s capital structure and profitability variables 
2.3 Variables Definition 
The overall study used profitability as a measure of assessing banks’ performance. More 
indicatively, three dependent variables are used as measures of the banks’ 
performance: Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) and Earnings per Share 
(EPS). Furthermore, capital structure as an independent variable is measured by using 
Debt to Equity (D/E) and Debt to Assets (D/A) ratios. In addition, two control variables, 
Bank Size and Growth are also included as standard determinants of banks’ profitability. 
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Return on Equity(ROE): ROE is used as a measure of profitability and it refers to the 
rate of return of the money that the equity investors have invested onto the firm. The 
ratio is calculated by the division of the firm’s net income by its shareholder equity and 
measures the efficiency by which managers generate profits by using the firm’s assets. It 
measures how efficiently the management is achieving the goal of shareholders’ wealth 
maximization. For this study, the ratio included the average shareholder equity of the 
firms. 
 
Return on Assets(ROA): ROA is also an indicator of profitability that demonstrates how 
profitable the firm is regarding its total assets. The ratio is calculated by the division of 
the firm’s net income by its total assets. For this study, the ratio included the average 
total assets of the firms.  
 
Earnings per Share(EPS): EPS is considered to be a measure of profitability in such a 
way by showing how much money a firm generates for each share of its stock. It is 
calculated as the net income of a firm and the subtraction of its preferred dividends, 
divided by the firm’s common shares outstanding. The higher the ratio, the more 
profitable the firm is. 
 
Debt to Equity(D/E): D/E is one of the most effective ways to understand the capital 
structure of a firm and the way to observe its financial leverage. The ratio is calculated 
by the division of the firm’s total liabilities by its shareholder equity and measures the 
degree to which a firm finances its operations via debt against its internal resources.  
 
Debt to Assets(D/A): D/A is also a financial leverage ratio which underlines the total 
amount of debt as compared to the firm’s total assets. It is calculated by the division of 
short term and long term debt by the firm’s total assets. Particularly, this ratio illustrates 
the amount of the firm’s assets that were financed by its creditors.  
 
Bank Size: Bank Size is considered to be an important determinant of the profitability 
and is included in the study as a control variable. Particularly, numerous studies (Yegon 
et al., 2014; Abor, 2008) have shown that this variable is positively connected with 
profitability. Additionally, Fan et al. (2012), in their model, calculated the firm size as the 
natural log of the total book value of assets. In this study as well, the banks’ size in the 
model is calculated as the natural log of the banks’ total assets.  
 
Growth: Growth is also included in the study as a control variable. In order to measure 
the banks’ growth, the study used the annual growth rate of the total assets of the banks.  
2.4 Model Specification 
Multiple regression models were used in order to investigate the relationship between 
the capital structure and the performance of the systemic banks in Greece. More 
specifically, three regression models were developed for the purpose of identifying this 
connection. These models take the following form: 
 
 
 
 
Where 
: is denoted as the dependent variable 
 is denoted as the constant term 
 is denoted as the intercept 
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 are denoted as coefficients 
 is denoted as the independent variables 
 is denoted as the error terms 
is denoted as the number of the banks 
 is denoted as the number of time periods 
 
Each of the three models is specifically formed as follows: 
 
Return on Assets: 
 
 
Return on Equity: 
 
 
Earnings per Share:  
 
2.5 Research Hypothesis 
The following hypotheses were formed in order to investigate the impact of the capital 
structure on the performance on the banking sector in Greece. 
H0: Capital structure has no significant impact on the performance of the banks 
H1: Capital structure has significant impact on the performance of the banks 
3 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
3.1 Empirical Results 
 
3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for both the dependent and 
independent variables of the study. All variables were calculated using balance sheet 
(book) values. The total number of observations was 43x7=301. The results of the 
descriptive statistics showed details regarding the variables of profitability as follows: the 
Return on Equity (ROE) presented a mean of -22,67%, a minimum of -797,53%, a 
maximum of 113,27%, the Return on Assets (ROA) presented a mean of -0,56%, a 
minimum of -6,05%, a maximum of 4,52% while the Earnings per Share (EPS) 
presented a mean of 1.068,71, a minimum of -687,22 and a maximum of 19375,76. 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics of the capital structure indicators showed the 
following: Debt to Equity (D/E) presented a mean of 88,20%, a minimum of 0% and a 
maximum of 298,98% while Debt to Assets (D/A) during the reporting years presented a 
mean of 5,99%, a minimum of 0% and a maximum 18,91%. As far as the control 
variables were concerned, the mean value of the size variable, measured by the natural 
log of the banks’ total assets was observed to be 11,199 while its minimum and 
maximum values were found to be 10,745 and 11,701 respectively. Additionally, the 
growth variable had an average value of 2,08%, a minimum of -29,36% and a maximum 
value of 50,10%. 
The negative percentages of Return on Equity and Return on Assets mean values 
suggested a poor performance during the period of study. Indicatively, the low levels of 
Return on Assets ratio showed that during the reporting years the managers of the 
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banks were not utilizing the banks’ assets effectively. Additionally, the high levels 
regarding the mean of Debt to Equity ratio signal the fact that during the reporting years 
2007-2018, in the middle of the global economic crisis, banks were highly affected and 
found to be financially leveraged with a large percentage of debt.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
DEBT TO 
ASSETS EPS 
DEBT TO 
EQUITY GROWTH 
RETURN ON 
ASSETS 
RETURN 
ON EQUITY SIZE 
 Mean  0.059967  1068.713  0.882095  0.020870 -0.000560 -0.226758  11.19922 
 Median  0.048700  0.080000  0.688800 -0.015200  0.001400  0.009600  11.13297 
 Maximum  0.189100  19375.76  2.989800  0.501000  0.045200  1.132700  11.70143 
 Minimum  0.000000 -687.2200  0.000000 -0.293600 -0.060500 -7.975300  10.74564 
 Std. Dev.  0.050361  3316.935  0.843604  0.158091  0.017721  1.312730  0.248636 
 Skewness  0.846965  4.385638  1.039033  1.036482 -0.841096 -4.991494  0.482268 
 Kurtosis  3.114261  23.42707  3.185555  4.291394  5.826998  29.73323  2.315206 
 Jarque-Bera  5.164393  885.4428  7.798742  10.68707  19.38886  1459.000  2.507030 
 Probability  0.075608  0.000000  0.020255  0.004779  0.000062  0.000000  0.285500 
 Sum  2.578600  45954.68  37.93010  0.897400 -0.024100 -9.750600  481.5666 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  0.106523  4.62E+08  29.89001  1.049696  0.013189  72.37690  2.596440 
 Observations  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 
 
3.1.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 regards the correlation matrix, which shows the correlation coefficients between 
the variables, indicating their relationship in this study. Correlation is used in order to 
measure the extent to which two or more variables fluctuate together. The correlations of 
the variables with themselves are always equal to one (1), and they can be found as the 
diagonal elements in the correlation matrix. In this study, Bank size (SIZE) was found to 
have negative association with all the other variables except the Growth variable. 
Additionally, Debt to Assets had a positive association with all the variables except for 
Bank Size (SIZE) and Growth, while Debt to Equity had a negative association with 
Return on Equity, Growth and Bank Size (SIZE), and a positive association with the rest 
of the variables. Further on, Earnings per Share (EPS) had a positive relationship with all 
the other variables besides the variables of Growth and Size. Return on Assets (ROA) 
was observed to have a positive relationship with all the other variables except for the 
Size, whereas Return on Equity (ROE) was observed to have a positive connection with 
Debt to Assets, Return on Assets and Earnings per Share (EPS). Finally, Growth 
variable appeared to have a positive relationship only with the variables of Size and 
Return on Assets. 
It is evident from the table below that the strongest correlation is observed between Debt 
to Assets and Debt to Equity, the two capital structure measures. However, there is no 
significant issue of multicollinearity since the independent variables are not strongly 
correlated, and therefore there is no necessity to exclude any of the variables.  
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
SIZE 
DEBT TO 
ASSETS 
DEBT TO 
EQUITY EPS 
RETURN 
ON ASSETS 
RETURN 
ON EQUITY GROWTH 
SIZE 1 
      
DEBT TO 
ASSETS -0.287555 1 
     
DEBT TO 
EQUITY -0.211578 0.887497 1 
    
EPS -0.225404 0.512488 0.514039 1 
   
RETURN 
ON ASSETS -0.203748 0.367622 0.182291 0.270991 1 
  
RETURN 
ON EQUITY -0.273277 0.237784 -0.043477 0.124389 0.477620 1 
 
GROWTH 0.198739 -0.200205 -0.291977 -0.120412 0.066928 -0.233887 
 
 
1 
 
3.1.3 Regression Analysis 
Regression Analysis refers to the statistical method which is used in order to measure 
the effect of one (independent) variable on another (dependent). The study uses 
regression analysis in order to test the hypothesis of whether there is a significant impact 
of capital structure on the profitability of the sampled banks. 
Table 3 presents the summary of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results 
given Return on Equity(ROE) as a dependent variable and Debt to Equity(D/E), Debt to 
Assets(D/A/), Growth and Bank Size (SIZE) as independent ones. The regression of 
these variables produced a coefficient of determination of 43,39% which means that the 
identified variables in this model account for 43,39% in the variability of Return on 
Equity, whereas the rest 56,61% is accounted for by other variables not included in the 
model. The coefficient of 35.08410 of Debt to Assets indicates that a unit increase in 
Debt to Assets will subsequently lead to 35.08410 unit increase in Return on Equity 
(ROE). Durbin-Watson (DW) test of 2,98 showed that there was no autocorrelation 
detected in the sample. The t-statistics value of 5.131843 combined with a p-value of 
0.0000 showed that Debt to Assets is very significant in explaining the banks’ 
performance as measured by Return on Equity variable, a factor which led to the 
conclusion that there is indeed a significant positive relationship between Debt to Assets 
and performance of the systemic banks listed in Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). This 
result suggests that an increase in the Debt to Assets ratio will also increase the 
profitability of the systemic banks in Greece, a matter which is also evident in the 
correlation analysis. 
However, a negative relationship is observed between Debt to Equity and Return on 
Equity, as it is underlined by the coefficient of -2.116107. This means that a unit increase 
in Debt to Equity will result in 2.116107 unit decrease in Return on Equity. The absolute 
t-statistics value of 5.168092 compared with the p-value of 0.0000 showed that Debt to 
Equity is very significant in explaining the banks’ performance as measured by the 
Return on Equity variable, a factor which led to the conclusion that there is a negative 
relationship between Debt to Equity and the performance of the systemic banks listed in 
ASE. This suggests that an increase in the Debt to Equity ratio will reduce the 
profitability of the systemic banks in Greece, a fact which is consistent with the results 
from the correlation analysis. During the reporting years, banks borrowed on higher 
volumes and therefore they also increased their interest payments, which had as a 
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consequence the reduction of their profits. The significant negative relationship that was 
found can be justified since lower profits that result from debt’s interest payments tend to 
reduce ROE. 
Size in terms of assets is statistically insignificant in explaining the banks’ performance, 
regardless to the Growth variable, for which is evident that it has a statistically significant 
negative relationship with banks’ performance. More indicatively, an increase in the 
banks’ growth in terms of assets will result to a decrease in their profitability, as 
measured by the Return on Equity ratio. 
 
Table 3: Regression ROE 
Dependent Variable: RETURN ON EQUITY  
Method: Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.881500 7.374494 0.797546 0.4301 
DEBT TO EQUITY -2.116107 0.409456 -5.168092 0.0000 
DEBT TO ASSETS 35.08410 6.836551 5.131843 0.0000 
SIZE -0.561340 0.654089 -0.858201 0.3962 
GROWTH -2.826078 1.034395 -2.732108 0.0095 
     
     R-squared 0.487827    Mean dependent var -0.226758 
Adjusted R-squared 0.433914    S.D. dependent var 1.312730 
S.E. of regression 0.987680    Akaike info criterion 2.922029 
Sum squared resid 37.06948    Schwarz criterion 3.126820 
Log likelihood -57.82363    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.997550 
F-statistic 9.048425    Durbin-Watson stat 2.981347 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000031    
     
      
 
The regression model using Return on Assets (ROA) which is also a measure of 
assessing the banks’ performance as the dependent variable, and Debt to Equity and 
Debt to Assets as measures of capital structure is presented in the table 4. 
The regression of these variables produced a coefficient of determination of 16,49% 
which means that the identified variables in this model account for 16,49% in the 
variability of Return on Assets, whereas the rest 83,51% is accounted for by other 
variables not included in the model. The coefficient of 0.317536 of Debt to Assets 
indicates that a unit increase in Debt to Assets will subsequently lead to 0.317536 unit 
increase in Return on Assets (ROA). Durbin-Watson (DW) test of 1,82 showed that there 
was no autocorrelation detected in the sample. The t-statistics value of 2.832937 and the 
p-value of 0.0073 showed that Debt to Assets is very significant in explaining the banks’ 
performance as measured by Return on Assets variable, a factor which led to the 
conclusion that there is indeed a positive relationship between Debt to Assets and 
performance of the systemic banks listed in ASE.  This result suggests that an increase 
in the Debt to Assets ratio will also increase the profitability of the systemic banks in 
Greece, a matter which is also evident in the correlation analysis.  
However, a negative relationship is observed between Debt to Equity and Return on 
Assets, as it is underlined by the coefficient of -0.012867. This means that a unit 
increase in Debt to Equity will result in 0.012867 unit decrease in Return on Assets. The 
absolute t-statistics value of 1.916630 compared with the p-value of 0.0628 showed that 
Debt to Equity is significant at 10% in explaining the banks’ performance as measured 
by Return on Assets variable. This output suggests that an increase in the Debt to Equity 
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ratio will cause a decrease on the profitability of the systemic banks in Greece, a matter 
which is contrary to the positive relationship that was presented in the correlation matrix. 
Growth and Size in terms of assets are both statistically insignificant in explaining the 
banks’ performance as measured by Return on Assets ratio. 
 
Table 4: Regression ROA 
 
Dependent Variable: RETURN_ON_ASSETS  
Method: Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.064266 0.120907 0.531535 0.5981 
DEBT TO EQUITY -0.012867 0.006713 -1.916630 0.0628 
DEBT TO ASSETS 0.317536 0.112087 2.832937 0.0073 
SIZE -0.006493 0.010724 -0.605512 0.5484 
GROWTH 0.009736 0.016959 0.574109 0.5693 
     
     R-squared 0.244472    Mean dependent var -0.000560 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164943    S.D. dependent var 0.017721 
S.E. of regression 0.016193    Akaike info criterion -5.299497 
Sum squared resid 0.009964    Schwarz criterion -5.094706 
Log likelihood 118.9392    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.223976 
F-statistic 3.073990    Durbin-Watson stat 1.827155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.027442    
     
      
 
The regression model using Earnings per Share (EPS) which is also considered to be a 
measure of assessing the banks’ performance as the dependent variable, and Debt to 
Equity and Debt to Assets as measures of capital structure is presented in the table 5. 
The regression of these variables produced a coefficient of determination of 21,43% 
which means that the identified variables in this model account for 21,43% in the 
variability of Earnings per Share, whereas the rest 78,57% is accounted for by other 
variables not included in the model. The coefficient of 13546.61 of Debt to Assets 
indicates that a unit increase in Debt to Assets will subsequently lead to 13546.61 unit 
increase in Earnings per Share (EPS). Durbin-Watson (DW) test of 1,14 showed that 
there was no autocorrelation detected in the sample. The t-statistics value of 0.665669 
and the p-value of 0.5096 showed that Debt to Assets is very insignificant in explaining 
the banks’ performance as measured by Earnings per Share (EPS) variable, a factor 
which led to the conclusion that there is an insignificant positive relationship between 
Debt to Assets and performance of the systemic banks listed in ASE.  
Moreover, a similar relationship is observed between Debt to Equity and Earnings per 
Share (EPS), as it is underlined by the coefficient of 1255.712. This means that a unit 
increase in Debt to Equity will result in 1255.712 unit increase in Return on Assets. The 
absolute t-statistics value of 1.030262 compared with the p-value of 0.3094 showed that 
Debt to Equity is insignificant in explaining the banks’ performance as measured by 
Earnings per Share variable. 
Growth and Size in terms of assets are both statistically insignificant in explaining the 
banks’ performance as measured by Return on Assets ratio. 
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Table 5: Regression EPS 
 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 14917.36 21951.66 0.679555 0.5009 
DEBT TO EQUITY 1255.712 1218.828 1.030262 0.3094 
DEBT TO ASSETS 13546.61 20350.36 0.665669 0.5096 
SIZE -1409.383 1947.028 -0.723864 0.4736 
GROWTH 734.5502 3079.083 0.238561 0.8127 
     
     R-squared 0.289173    Mean dependent var 1068.713 
Adjusted R-squared 0.214350    S.D. dependent var 3316.935 
S.E. of regression 2940.029    Akaike info criterion 18.91917 
Sum squared resid 3.28E+08    Schwarz criterion 19.12396 
Log likelihood -401.7622    Hannan-Quinn criter. 18.99469 
F-statistic 3.864723    Durbin-Watson stat 1.140948 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009909    
     
          
 
The outcome of the study showed mixed results. From the one hand there was evidence 
of significant impact of capital structure on Return on Assets and Return on Equity, 
however as far as Earnings per Share were concerned, the analysis showed that capital 
structure was insignificant in explaining the banks’ performance.  
The findings of the study are consistent to the findings of Awunyo-Vitor and Badu (2012), 
whose study found a significant negative relationship between Return on Equity and 
Debt to Equity. However, as regards the relationship between Return on Assets and 
Debt to Equity, their results showed an insignificant negative relationship. The results 
regarding capital structure as measured by Debt to Equity and profitability are consistent 
to the findings of Goyal (2013), who found a significant negative impact of the capital 
structure variable and the performance indicators as measured by ROE, ROA and EPS. 
Moreover, this fact implies that profitable firms are more dependent on equity as their 
main financing route (Goyal, 2013).  
Furthermore, the results that concerned capital structure as measured by Debt to Assets 
ratio are consistent to the findings of Idode et al. (2014), whose study found that Debt to 
Assets ratio has a significant positive impact on the profitability of the Nigerian banks, as 
measured by Return on Equity. Accordingly, the results of the positive relationship of 
Debt to Assets with Return on Equity are similar to the findings of Gill et al. (2011).  
The findings of the study were found to be inconsistent to the findings of Yegon et al. 
(2014), whose study regarding the banking sector of Kenya, found a statistically 
insignificant relationship between Return on Equity and Debt to Assets. Moreover, the 
results were also inconsistent to the findings of Shubita and Alsawalhah (2012), whose 
findings showed a negative relationship between Return on Equity and Debt to Assets. 
In addition, the results of the study with regards to the relationship between Return on 
Equity, Return on Assets, Earnings per Share and Debt to Assets are inconsistent to the 
findings Siddik et al. (2017) who found a significant negative relationship between the 
capital structure and profitability variables. 
Finally, the results of the study were consistent to the findings of Hasan et al. (2014), 
whose study found insignificant relationship between Earnings per Share and Debt to 
Assets. Nevertheless, their findings as regards to the relationship between Return on 
Equity, Return on Assets and Debt to Assets (insignificant negative relationship and 
   
24 
 
significant negative relationship accordingly) were inconsistent to the results of this 
study. 
4 Conclusion 
The study investigated the impact of capital structure on the financial performance of the 
systemic banks in Greece. In order to establish a comprehensive analysis of the study, 
numerous ideas were employed. Consolidated data were imported from secondary 
sources, mainly from the ThomsonONE database and the financial statements of the 
banks and were analyzed in line with the study’s purpose. The population of the study 
consisted of all the banks listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Accordingly, the 
study covered a sample from the four (4) systemic banks that were listed in the Athens 
Stock Exchange (ASE), covering a period of twelve (12) years, from 2007 to 2018. For 
the analysis of the data, multiple regression models and correlation analysis were used 
via the EViews 9 software.  
The results from the regression analysis showed a significant positive relationship 
between Debt to Assets (D/A) and Return on Equity (ROE) as well as between Debt to 
Assets(D/A) and Return on Assets (ROA). Moreover, a significant negative relationship 
was presented, that is the one between Debt to Equity and Return on Equity (ROE) as 
well as between Debt to Equity and Return on Assets (ROA).  
From the significant positive relationship between the Return on Equity (ROE) variable 
and the Debt to Assets ratio, trade-off theory is evident. The theory suggests that higher 
leverage contributes to higher profitability. Additionally, as banks take advantage of tax 
savings, the trade-off theory is also validated as tax savings derived from the use of debt 
provide income to the banks.  
More indicatively, the study showed that an increase in the Debt to Assets(D/A) ratio has 
a significant positive impact on the performance of the listed systemic banks in Greece, 
which is measured by Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Moreover, 
an increase in the Debt to Equity ratio has a significant negative impact on the 
performance of the listed systemic banks in Greece, which is measured by Return on 
Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Additionally, as capital structure is 
concerned, the analysis showed that it is insignificant in explaining the performance of 
the banks, as measured by Earnings per Share (EPS) ratio. However, due to fact that 
the sample of the study included data from the years that the global financial economic 
crisis was on its verge, the insignificance of the results regarding the Earnings per Share 
(EPS) performance ratio and the capital structure variables can be justified. 
Consequently, as regards the hypothesis testing, the overall study rejects the null 
hypothesis which suggests that ‘’Capital structure has no significant impact on the 
performance of the banks’’. The results of the study confirm the hypothesis (H1), which 
states that indeed capital structure has a significant impact on the performance of the 
banks in Greece.  
The results of the study reflected the tremendous effect of the global financial crisis into 
the Greek economy by reducing financial liquidity and business activity. The banking 
system during the crisis was found to be robust up to some extent, but it faced some 
severe imported risks which led the banks resort to massive amounts of debt.  
The management of the banks should be very prudent when they resort to debt as a 
source of financing their operations since this study signaled the fact that besides the 
positive relationship, there could be also a negative relationship between capital 
structure and financial performance variables. Moreover, as per the pecking order 
theory, managers should choose to finance their activities mostly with internal financing 
such as retained earnings, and lastly resorting to debt. 
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To conclude with, banks should be very cautious in designing their financing activities 
and capital structure decisions, whereas they should always be focused to the aim of 
achieving an optimum mixture of debt and equity in the purpose of maximizing their 
profitability. 
4.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The limitation of this study is that the sample only focuses on the systemic banks which 
are listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). In reality, there are several other banks 
that are listed on the ASE, therefore the results of the study regarding the significant 
positive relationship between capital structure and banks’ performance may not 
represent the overall banking sector in Greece. Moreover, the time period of this study 
includes years within and after the economic crisis (2007-2018). In order to get more 
accurate and defined results, it would be more appropriate to create different regressions 
with data pre-crisis and post-crisis. 
The study focused on the investigation of the impact of capital structure on the banks’ 
performance. Future research should investigate generalizations of the study’s findings 
beyond the systemic banks in Greece. Research should include a larger sample of all 
the listed banks in Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) as well as more capital structure 
variables such as short-term and long-term debt. Important control variables such as 
banks’ age and ownership could be used in order to detect other determinants that affect 
the relationship between capital structure and banks’ profitability. Moreover, since this 
study used mostly secondary data which are subjective in nature, it is recommended that 
the use of both primary-up to the level that this could be achieved- and secondary data 
should be included in order to obtain more solid information.  
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6 Appendix 
6.1 Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Presentation of the study’s capital structure and profitability variables 
 
6.2  Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
DEBT TO 
ASSETS EPS 
DEBT TO 
EQUITY GROWTH 
RETURN ON 
ASSETS 
RETURN 
ON EQUITY SIZE 
 Mean  0.059967  1068.713  0.882095  0.020870 -0.000560 -0.226758  11.19922 
 Median  0.048700  0.080000  0.688800 -0.015200  0.001400  0.009600  11.13297 
 Maximum  0.189100  19375.76  2.989800  0.501000  0.045200  1.132700  11.70143 
 Minimum  0.000000 -687.2200  0.000000 -0.293600 -0.060500 -7.975300  10.74564 
 Std. Dev.  0.050361  3316.935  0.843604  0.158091  0.017721  1.312730  0.248636 
 Skewness  0.846965  4.385638  1.039033  1.036482 -0.841096 -4.991494  0.482268 
 Kurtosis  3.114261  23.42707  3.185555  4.291394  5.826998  29.73323  2.315206 
 Jarque-Bera  5.164393  885.4428  7.798742  10.68707  19.38886  1459.000  2.507030 
 Probability  0.075608  0.000000  0.020255  0.004779  0.000062  0.000000  0.285500 
 Sum  2.578600  45954.68  37.93010  0.897400 -0.024100 -9.750600  481.5666 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  0.106523  4.62E+08  29.89001  1.049696  0.013189  72.37690  2.596440 
 Observations  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
SIZE 
DEBT TO 
ASSETS 
DEBT TO 
EQUITY EPS 
RETURN 
ON ASSETS 
RETURN 
ON EQUITY GROWTH 
SIZE 1 
      
DEBT TO 
ASSETS -0.287555 1 
     
DEBT TO 
EQUITY -0.211578 0.887497 1 
    
EPS -0.225404 0.512488 0.514039 1 
   
RETURN 
ON ASSETS -0.203748 0.367622 0.182291 0.270991 1 
  
RETURN 
ON EQUITY -0.273277 0.237784 -0.043477 0.124389 0.477620 1 
 
GROWTH 0.198739 -0.200205 -0.291977 -0.120412 0.066928 -0.233887 
 
 
1 
 
Table 3: Regression ROE 
Dependent Variable: RETURN ON EQUITY  
Method: Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.881500 7.374494 0.797546 0.4301 
DEBT TO EQUITY -2.116107 0.409456 -5.168092 0.0000 
DEBT TO ASSETS 35.08410 6.836551 5.131843 0.0000 
SIZE -0.561340 0.654089 -0.858201 0.3962 
GROWTH -2.826078 1.034395 -2.732108 0.0095 
     
     R-squared 0.487827    Mean dependent var -0.226758 
Adjusted R-squared 0.433914    S.D. dependent var 1.312730 
S.E. of regression 0.987680    Akaike info criterion 2.922029 
Sum squared resid 37.06948    Schwarz criterion 3.126820 
Log likelihood -57.82363    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.997550 
F-statistic 9.048425    Durbin-Watson stat 2.981347 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000031    
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Table 4: Regression ROA 
 
Dependent Variable: RETURN_ON_ASSETS  
Method: Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.064266 0.120907 0.531535 0.5981 
DEBT TO EQUITY -0.012867 0.006713 -1.916630 0.0628 
DEBT TO ASSETS 0.317536 0.112087 2.832937 0.0073 
SIZE -0.006493 0.010724 -0.605512 0.5484 
GROWTH 0.009736 0.016959 0.574109 0.5693 
     
     R-squared 0.244472    Mean dependent var -0.000560 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164943    S.D. dependent var 0.017721 
S.E. of regression 0.016193    Akaike info criterion -5.299497 
Sum squared resid 0.009964    Schwarz criterion -5.094706 
Log likelihood 118.9392    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.223976 
F-statistic 3.073990    Durbin-Watson stat 1.827155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.027442    
     
      
Table 5: Regression EPS 
 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 14917.36 21951.66 0.679555 0.5009 
DEBT TO EQUITY 1255.712 1218.828 1.030262 0.3094 
DEBT TO ASSETS 13546.61 20350.36 0.665669 0.5096 
SIZE -1409.383 1947.028 -0.723864 0.4736 
GROWTH 734.5502 3079.083 0.238561 0.8127 
     
     R-squared 0.289173    Mean dependent var 1068.713 
Adjusted R-squared 0.214350    S.D. dependent var 3316.935 
S.E. of regression 2940.029    Akaike info criterion 18.91917 
Sum squared resid 3.28E+08    Schwarz criterion 19.12396 
Log likelihood -401.7622    Hannan-Quinn criter. 18.99469 
F-statistic 3.864723    Durbin-Watson stat 1.140948 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009909    
     
     
 
